Mr. Allen — National Security Council’s “Table of Contents”

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950) A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950 TOP SECRET [Washington,] April 7, 1950 Contents Terms of Reference Analysis I. Background of the Present World Crisis II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design A. Nature of the Conflict B. Objectives C. Means V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential VII. Present Risks VIII. Atomic Armaments A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons C. International Control of Atomic Energy IX. Possible Courses of Action Introduction The Role of Negotiation A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying Out These Projects B. The Second Course--Isolation C. The Third Course--War D. The Remaining Course of Action--A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World Conclusions Recommendations